Admiralty Practicum
Volume 2008
Issue 2 Winter 2008 - 2009

Article 7

Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. Partnership United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit 542 F.3d 43 (Decided August 22,
2008)
Marc Dombrowski, Class of 2010

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT FOUND A
MARITIME CONTRACT, BUT VACATED A RULE B ATTACHMENT FOR FAILURE TO
PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the nature of a
non-compete,

non-disclosure salvage agreement was maritime in nature, but

vacated the Rule B attachment because the Plaintiff failed to present a prima facie
case to pierce the corporate veil.

Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. Partnership
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
542 F.3d 43
(Decided August 22, 2008)
The S . S . Central America was a U.S. Mail Steamship that sank off the coast of South Carolina in
1 857. Plaintiffs were a group of workers that contracted to assist the defendants - individuals and
corporations - in the recovery of the wreckage. Pursuant to an order entered by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, defendants obtained a portion of the treasure and sold
it. Defendants, however, failed to compensate plaintiffs for their role in the salvage. Therefore,
plaintiffs brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County, Ohio, to recover the portion
of profits procured from the wreckage that defendants had promised, but failed to pay. Defendants
removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on the grounds
that the dispute concerned a maritime contract and was governed by federal law.
Meanwhile, plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York and obtained an ex parte order for the issuance of a writ of attachment pursuant to Rule B of
the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. Defendants moved, by way of an
order to show cause, to vacate the attachment and for fees and costs associated with the application. The
district court vacated the attached as to all but one of the individually named defendants, defendant
Thompson. The district court denied vacatur as to the corporate defendants and also denied the
defendants requests for fees and costs. Defendants appealed the district court's order and plaintiffs
cross-appealed.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendants argued
that the contract was not maritime in nature; but rather it was a simple non-compete, non-disclosure
contract. The plaintiffs argue that non-compete, non-disclosure clauses are not mutually exclusive to
maritime contracts.
The contracts at issue are non-compete and non-disclosure contracts, but they also reference
maritime service or transactions. The Second Circuit relied on the refined distinction between maritime
and non-maritime contracts as set out by Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. James N Kirby Pty,
Ltd.1 Norfolk asks whether a contract has "reference to maritime service or maritime transactions."2 In
this regard, the Second Circuit found defendants claim disingenuous because defendants had removed
plaintiffs' earlier suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on the ground that the contract was maritime in nature
and, therefore, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal also held that federal law governed the dispute.
Defendants also argued that plaintiffs failed to meet the notice and service requirements of a
Rule B attachment. However, the plaintiffs' briefs and the record both show that plaintiffs gave
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defendants notice of attachment as soon as the plaintiffs became aware that the defendants' assets had
been attached.
Defendants further argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the
attachment for equitable reasons. The defendants cited Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty
Ltd., 3 to support their claim. In Aqua Stoli, the court ordered vacatur of an attachment pursuant to Rule
E(4)(f)4 because plaintiffs did not satisfy the minimum requirements of Rule B. In contrast, the district
court in this dispute found that plaintiffs satisfied the minimum requirements of attachment. Defendants
continued to argue that under Aqua Stoli, the attachment must be vacated on equitable grounds if the
defendant can prove: "( 1 ) the defendant is subject to suit in a convenient adjacent jurisdiction; (2) the
plaintiff could obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in the district where the plaintiff is
located; or (3) the plaintiff has already obtained sufficient security for the potential judgment, by
attachment or otherwise."5 The Second Circuit held that defendants failed to show any of these
equitable grounds for vacatur and, therefore, the district court properly denied the defendants motion.
In regards to the defendants' motion for fees and costs associated with defending the plaintiffs'
application for a writ of attachment, the defendants argued that they failed to follow the procedures
outline in Rule 1 1 and, subsequently, they should be forgiven as a result of unusual circumstances and
simple redundancy. The Second Circuit found this argument meritless since defendants were unable to
produce any case law supporting the proposition defendants advanced.
The Second Circuit also considered plaintiffs cross-appeal of the district court's decision to
vacate writs of attachment as to all but one of the individually named defendants. The district court had
found that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for attachment as to these defendants.
Plaintiffs relied on a 1 999 statement by defendant Thompson - the only individually named defendant
for whom the district did not vacate the order of attachment - that he had the authority to speak for
investors and partners (i.e. the other individually named defendants). The Second Circuit, however,
found that Thompson did not mention any other defendant by name. Therefore, the court held that
plaintiffs did not state a prima facie case as to those other individually named defendants.
Plaintiffs other argument was based on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Kirno Hill
Corp. v. Holt, 6 states that a plaintiff may attach an individuals assets if that individual hides behind a
corporate structure to commit fraud. The court considered the following, non-exhaustive list of factors
to decide whether plaintiffs could pierce the corporate veil: "( 1 ) the intermingling of corporate and
personal funds, (2) undercapitalization of the corporation, and (3) failure to maintain separate books and
records or other formal legal requirements for the corporation." 7 Ultimately, plaintiffs were unable to
show any of these elements. The Second Circuit affirmed this part of the district court's decision.
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3 460 F.3d 434, 439 (2d Cir.2006)
FED.R.CIV.P., ADM. SUPP. RULE E(4)(f)
5 Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 445 (2d Cir. 2006).
6 618 F.2d 982, 985 (2d Cir.1980).
7 William Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Waters, 890 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir.1989).
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